copied from wikipedia (there's more to the explanation, but I don't feel it necessary):
Moore himself presented the paradox in two ways.[1] The first more fundamental way of setting the problem up starts from the following three premises:
- It can be true at a particular time both that p, and that I do not believe that p.
- I can assert or believe one of the two at a particular time.
- I cannot without absurdity assert or believe both of them at the same time
The example in question is "It is raining outside, but I do not believe that it is." Therefore:
- It can be true both that "it is raining outside," and that I do not believe that "it is raining outside"
- I can assert/believe one of the two
- I cannot believe both at the same time
- The statement "It is raining outside, but I do not believe that it is" can conceivable appear in no less than 3 distinct communicative contexts
- as part of a real-life discourse between 2 people
- as an example of the paradox itself, or in any context in which the sentance functions as an example within the real meaningful discourse
- as a narrative utterance[object] meant to convey a fictional occurence of #1
I. It is generally assumed that any grammatical modification of the sentence itself will eliminate the paradox. This assumption plays out in all the examples described in the wikipedia article, but since I have never read an explanation I feel I need to explain it for my solution. The structure of the sentence itself falls under what I call rhetorical displacement. In essence, the sentence is itself a rhetorical manipulation of a single idea ("I do not believe that it is raining"), which separates the phenomenon under observation from the value judgment of the observer. In other words, the displacement itself is meant to clarify meaning and expose a binary opposition between lower level observation and higher level interpretation. But, a fundamental problem arises because rhetorical displacement itself constructs a new syntagm which inevitably alters the process of semiosis. This schism of meaning will either be disspelled at a higher level of structure (in the case of #2 and #3 above) or else manifest in the form of a logical paradox (as in case #1). [more on this as my answer unfolds]
II. The reason that changing the structure of the sentence under consideration eliminates the paradox is directly connected to the context in which it is uttered [my list above].
III. Because #2 on my list posits the sentence as an example within a different discourse, the paradox itself still exists but has no bearing on the meaning of the larger sentence in which it is altered (a silly statement, but nonetheless important), and thus provides no answer to the paradox itelf.
IV. Therefore, the explanation for the paradox itself lies in the differing perspectives inherent in #1 and #3, i.e. the paradox exists in #1 but not in #3 for a very good reason: perspective.
V. In order to understand why the preceding statement is true, I must fully explain the semantic content of the sentence.
The sentence "It is raining outside, but I do not believe it is" contains two distinct meaningful syntagms operating in two distinct conceptual spaces.
- The syntagm "It is raining" is a linguistic manifestation of the act of observing/identifying a physical phenomenon: I observe the phenomenon in some way, associate the phenomenon with a linguistic signifier (in this case the compound verb 'is raining'), and finally state the act of semiosis as one of fact. The word "outside" further qualifies the experience by connoting the binary opposition "outside/inside" and implying that I am located "inside" a space in which it is not raining, but am still capable of observing the phenomenon in some way. Thus, "it is raining outside" is located within a rhetoric of observation.
- The syntagm "...but I do not believe it is" can be broken down in a similar way, but contains an additional level of unintelligibility, i.e. the "it is" of the second syntagm can be misread. Regardless, it is safe to assume that the second syntagm is actually "...but I do not believe that it is [raining]." Thus, the word "but" logically places the second syntagm in opposition with the first. "I do not believe it is [raining]" relies on two consecutive semiotic processes. First, the phenomena is observed (without any indication of the temporal space occupied by the observer), the association with a linguistic signifier is actively questioned by the observer, and a rhetoric of doubt shapes the form of the utterance.
VI. The reason that perspective is the solution to the paradox now makes sense. In context #3, the illogical connection of the two segments is mollified by the creation of a narrative present which resides in a completely different conceptual space from the actual present. In narrating the situation at hand, the first segment is a description of a phenomena occuring in the narrative present made from the actual present, while the second segment is a manifestation of information gained by my own act of remembering that in the past (which is now presented as a narrative present), I did not believe that it was raining.
Confused yet? Just wait, that was the easy part...
VII. I wrote in V that the sentence contains unitelligible characteristics. According to Barthes, all text contains the hypothetical possibility of being misread. Long story short, text as notation for meaningful discourse fails to communicate the context in which it should be read. Thus, the paradox exists only when the sentence is isolated as it is above (and I have shown you one of several contexts in which the sentence is absolutely logical- as narrative). The other contexts involve the possibility of complete communication failure; i could conceivably musunderstand/misinterpret one or both segments of the sentence and thus understand the sentence as being completely logical.
VIII. THEREFORE, the paradox itself exists solely because of the distortion caused by rhetorical displacement. In uttering the sentence to another person in the real present, I have committed a grammatical mistake and created a logical paradox by uttering the two terms of the same discrete binary opposition in different rhetorical modes as though they were consequential ideas. In other words, I have performed the same act of semiosis twice, made a different choice each time, and misread the semiotic act itself.
IX. The paradox itself, that both can be true but I cannot believe them at the same time, then is misleading. The real underlying question is "why do we as humans perceive existence solely in terms of binary opposition?" For that question, I have no answer.
p.s. i know my answer is long-winded, confusing, cites no references, makes conceptual leaps that Derrida would jump all over, needs a whole lot more background information, and needs to be rewritten. If you read this please comment: ask questions, criticize, suggest things. Think of this as a rough draft I will be working on for a while.
